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Abstract
This paper looks at the struggles faced by German policymakers in the years
following reunification. East Germany struggled with an immediate transformation from
a planned economy to a social market economy, while West Germany sent billions of
Deutsche Marks to its eastern states. Because of the unequal nature of these two
countries, policymakers had to decide on what they would place more emphasis: social
benefits for the East or economic protection for the West. The West German state-level,
Federal Government and the East German governments struggled in finding
multilaterally beneficial policies. This paper looks at the four key issues of reunification:
currency conversion, transfer payments, re-privatization, and unemployment. In
following the German Basic Law, the policies pursued in terms of these issues tended to
place emphasis on eastern social benefits.
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1. Introduction: The Unification of a Divided Germany
In 1949, Germany officially split into two countries – the German Democratic
Republic (GDR) and the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG). One was communist, the
other a federal parliamentary republic. One was a state-controlled economy, and the other
a social market economy. These starkly different styles of government resulted in very
different economies and standards of living. During this time of separation, the Western
world did not acknowledge the GDR due to continually mounting tensions with the
USSR.

After decades of a sputtering economy and political oppression, the East

Germans spoke out in Leipzig in 1989. Widespread protests across Eastern Europe
sparked revolutionary change, including the resignation of East German Chairman of the
Council State, Erich Honecker. The Soviet Union soon began to approach its demise and
the two Germanys found themselves wishing to reunite.
Reunification would prove to be difficult, due to the deep schism between the
FRG and GDR economies. Following World War II, the FRG adopted a free-market
economy with only limited elements of planning and management, also known as a social
market economy, to help recover from the war. The GDR, on the other hand, chose to
pursue a fully planned economy. In 1948, at the time of the formal division, Fritz
Selbmann, an official in the Socialist Unity Party (SED) provided insight into the East
German economic policy and practice:
We will plan down to the last machine, down to the last production unit of stateowned industry, and then we will see who is stronger – the planned state-owned
1

2

industry or the non-planned free economy. For the struggle between free economy
and planned state-owned economy will take place in practice… Naturally the
planned economy is stronger; naturally things will go better where man uses his
reason.1

Initially, Selbmann would turn out to be correct. The fully planned economy helped save
the East German economy following the war, especially because of the shortage of
resources and reparations East Germany had to pay the Soviets for the war-related
devastation. However, the GDR could only compete with the FRG for a short period of
time and by 1971 Erich Honecker ended economic reform attempts and thereby gave up
competing with West German productivity and consumption.2 Although many countries,
including the U.S. and West Germany, suffered great economic blows during the 1970s,
East Germany operated in a way that made recovery impossible. By the time of collapse,
GDR productivity was less than 30 percent of its western counterpart.
The centralized planned economy hurt East Germany in many ways. The lack of
competition left businesses with no incentive to reduce costs, increase productivity, or
innovate. The high government subsidies wasted huge amounts of economic resources.
Some heavily subsidized goods and services included food, public transportation, energy,
and rent, among many others. In 1989, subsidies consisted of almost one-quarter of
planned public expenditure. Furthermore, corporations gave overly generous employee
benefits, referred to as “general provision”, which paid for things such as kindergarten,
outpatient services, and vacations. General provision created an environment where

1
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employees rarely changed jobs, which, combined with the right to work policy, led to
artificially high levels of employment.3 Employing too many workers decreases
efficiency and drives costs up for corporations. This causes prices to subsequently
increase, demand to decrease and, eventually, the economy to suffer.
GDR production equipment provides a perfect example of the Soviet Bloc’s failed
economic policy. With an already deteriorating economy, the SED officials chose to
invest in modernizing microelectronic production equipment, rather than machines for
more relevant goods such as food, tools, or building production. By 1989, only
approximately one-third of machine-tool production and foodstuffs equipment were less
than five years old, compared to the microelectronic production equipment of which
more than 50 percent was less than five years old.4 Despite electronics being a lucrative
business, a certain microchip which cost 8 marks to produce on the world market cost
East German producers more than 530 marks.5 This 6,625 percent increase in production
costs emphasizes the gross inefficiency of the centrally-planned economy as well as just
how far behind East Germany was from the Western World.
Even in the face of possible reunification, eastern cooperation with West
Germany was limited. Despite General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev’s small steps
towards reform with perestroika and glasnost, his response to West German Chancellor
Helmut Kohl’s 1989 Ten-Point plan for unification proved that the Eastern Bloc would
not embrace change too readily. On the day following Kohl’s proposal to the West
German Federal Parliament, Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze, condemned
3
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the Ten Points plan and publicly opposed any border changes.6 Furthermore, although
the Soviet powers were open to economic ties with West Germany, neither state was
willing to make the concessions demanded by the other.
Creating a mutually beneficial reunification agreement for East and West
Germany presented a daunting task for both governments. The complex relationships,
however, did not end with just the East versus the West. As Allan Riding noted in a New
York Times article on February 15, 1990, surrounding states, particularly Poland and
France, worried about the repercussions of a united Germany given its tumultuous and
aggressive history. Key questions arose regarding the German-Polish borders as well as
how a united Germany would change the balance of powers in the European Community.
A fragmented Germany seemed safe, but at the same time, Western powers feared the
Soviet Union and hoped for its downfall.7
East-West cooperation and the support of neighboring states were not the only
hurdles of reunification. The four hurdles outlined in this paper became relevant during
the reunification process. These hurdles were:
1. Consolidating the Ost-Mark and the Deutsch Mark
2. Deciding the amount of transfer payments the West would pay the East
3. Re-privatizing formerly expropriated properties
4. Avoiding high unemployment rates.
The policies designed to solve these problems could focus primarily on either
economically or socially beneficial results. Therefore, policymakers had to decide which
outcome was more important.

6
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Three levels of politicians and the Central Bank participated in the reunification
and placed value on various factors. The West German federal government sought a
speedy reunification and wanted to appease both the East and the West. East German
politicians feared an unequal reunification in which the westerners dominated the
easterners. The West German politicians at the Länder, or state, level placed their
citizens’ interest first and wanted to control the extent to which they would pay for the
reunification. The West German Central Bank had existed until reunification with full
autonomy.8 Due to its freedom from any political authorities or pressures, it preferred
austere policies that most benefitted the western economy. Although politicians did not
come to a unanimous decision, the policies that they pursued tended to place more
importance on social than economic problems. By doing so, post-1990 Germany turned
into a psychologically unified country with deep and long-lasting economic issues, such
as high government debt, tax rates, and unemployment.
This thesis will explore the four major issues and how politicians decided to solve
them. The rest of this chapter will present the concerns felt by citizens and politicians
alike at the start of the reunification process. The second chapter will delve into each
factor and look at how the chosen policies tended to favor social rather than economic
benefits. Finally, the conclusion will look at the implications of these policies.
Consolidating Currencies
A major hurdle was how to reconcile the different currencies. While West
Germany prospered with the Deutschmark, East Germany struggled with its weaker

8
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Ostmark. Politicians and the Bundesbank, the West German central bank, had to work
together to placate citizens from both Germanys while protecting the West German
economy and enabling both economies to converge. But the question remained how to
broker such a deal with two such different currencies. The Bundesbank suggested an
austere program that would minimize damage to the West German economy, while
Chancellor Helmut Kohl recommended, and eventually implemented a more generous
program that expedited the unification and placed social issues across Germany above
economic issues in the West. The politicians and bankers saw before them a zero-sum
game where both sides desperately wanted to win.
Transfer Payment Levels
As mentioned above, citizens of the West as well as their representatives worried
that the reunification would result in increased taxes and debt. The stronger economy had
the responsibility of supporting the weaker economy’s transformation to capitalism. After
all, the East German economy was becoming a part of the West German economy. The
Länder, West German federal, and East German politicians would have to come up with
a solution to finance the reunification without placing too much burden on West German
taxpayers.
Returning Expropriated Properties
A defining characteristic of Communism was expropriating property. For West
German businesses, for civilians who had fled or moved to the FRG, and for East
Germans who had simply lost their homes to the Soviet authorities, the fall of the Soviet
regime raised the possibility of reclaiming formerly confiscated property. This spread
fear throughout East Germany and curiosity throughout West Germany.

Eastern

7

businesses had already begun accepting investments from western businesses and feared
having to pay retribution once unification was complete. Eastern civilians feared former
homeowners would return to stake their claims and/or significantly raise the rent.9
Politicians had to decide which would create a more unified country: encouraging private
investment in East Germany or returning private property to the rightful owners.
Avoiding High Unemployment
Fears of a mass exodus to West Germany posed great concern for future
employment levels across Germany. An additional concern was that competition with
West German corporations would result in East German enterprises failing.

10

Fewer

factories meant fewer jobs, and with an open border, Easterners could flood the West,
creating more job competition in a country that already accepted increasingly high
numbers of migrant workers. Clearly, neither East nor West Germany would benefit from
increasing unemployment, and therefore policy makers would have to approach this
problem very carefully and deliberately so as to not upset the balance. Furthermore, the
socialist system had provided many benefits and fostered artificially high levels of
employment. East Germans would lose both of these comforts with the introduction of a
social market. To ease this loss, East Germany adopted West German employment
benefits, but altered them in an even more socially advantageous way, which would be
very expensive for the West and create an inefficient workforce in the East.

9

Hämäläinen, Uniting Germany: Actions and Reactions, 130.
W.R Smyser., The Economy of United Germany: Colossus at the Crossroads (New
York: St. Martin’s Press, 1992), 32.
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2. Unification: Competing Economic and Social Policies
2.1 Conversion Rate of Currency Turnover
The four previously mentioned hurdles – currency turnover, transfer payments, reprivatization and unemployment – created an extremely delicate situation for politicians
and economists alike. The issue alone of currency turnover caused disagreement between
the Bundesbank and politicians, the Bundesbank trying to protect the famously stable
Deutschmark and Chancellor Kohl wanting to send “a clear, unmistakable signal of hope
and encouragement… to the people of the GDR.”11
The disagreement did not end with just the Bundesbank and Bundesregierung.
Rather every organization and interest group had an opinion on the matter, as this single
decision could save or destroy not only the unification efforts, but also the economies of
both Germanys. GDR politicians had recently run for Volkskammer election, calling for a
1:1 turnover rate for monetary holdings and wages. Other organizations of the same
opinion included the Federal Union of German Employers’ Association, the western
SPD, parts of the CDU/CSU, and the Federal Minister of Labor. On the other side of the
issue were the Bundesbank, Federal Finance Minister, and Federal Economics Ministry,
all of which insisted on a 2:1 conversion rate for debts, savings accounts, wages,
pensions, and cash holdings over DM 2,000. This proposal sparked massive
demonstrations in the East. The Bundesbank’s proposal would lead to fewer economic
11

Helmut Kohl. “Kohl’s Currency Union Proposal, 13 February 1990,” in Uniting
Germany: Documents and Debates, 1944-1993, eds. Konrad H. Jarausch and Volker Gransow
(Providence: Berghahn Books, 1994), 111.
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losses in the West, but would place the Easterners at an even greater disadvantage.
Federal Labor Minister Norbert Blüm declared that a conversion rate other than 1:1
would “open up profound social fault lines and have destabilizing political
consequences.” Furthermore, he added, East Germans would suffer “glaring losses
relative to their previous, already lower, living standards… particularly pensioners,
families, and the unemployed.”12 It quickly became clear that a 2:1 rate was ideal for the
FRG Deutschmark and economy, but would ruin any chances for a socially and
economically unified Germany.
Although it was unfeasible for politicians to accept the Bundesbank’s proposal for
the German Economic, Social, and Monetary Union (GEMSU), the 1:1 conversion rate
was not free of consequences. The eventual decision, passed in May 1990, created a
rather complex system of monetary holdings conversion to go into effect on 1 June. In
essence, holdings and claims faced a 2:1 conversion rate; however, cash and savings
accounts between DM 2,000 and 6,000 were eligible for a 1:1 rate, depending on the
holder’s age. Firm’s debts and housing loans were both converted at a 2:1 conversion rate
and, alone, totaled over 360 billion Ostmarks.

13

Unfortunately, as Pöhl showed

Chancellor Kohl, a 1:1 rate would result in the bankruptcy of many GDR businesses. The
Bundesbank President noted that with a 1:1 ratio, the GDR’s debt burden, which foreign
creditors would receive in DMs, combined with their debts owed to the GDR national
bank would translate to annual interest rates in excess of DM 20,000 million.14
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Ritter, The Price of German Unity, 152-153
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Germany (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1992), 51.
14
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13

10

Because there was no single economic and socially ideal solution to the currency
conversion, many problems arose in East Germany. One such problem faced by eastern
German producers was a phenomenon called the “price-cost squeeze”. This resulted from
former GDR businesses switching to Deutschmarks while having to set prices and cover
costs, which included the ever-increasing wages.15 Furthermore, new exposure to West
German and international open market competition naturally caused output prices to fall.
Low prices translated to decreasing revenues across East Germany. By the end of the first
year of unification, the combination of currency appreciation and unprecedented levels of
competition led to a two-thirds fall in East German output and one-third fall in total
national output.16
The Council of Experts had worried and warned that introducing the Deutsche
Mark too quickly would give East Germans the false illusion of closing the West-East
gap in living standards.17 Although the politicians did not wish to give false hope, they
wanted to create both psychological and economic unification – an impossible feat
without a single currency. In reality, by placing more importance on social than economic
unification, the GEMSU led to immediate economic turmoil that continued for several
years.

15

Thomas Lange and Geoffrey Pugh, The Economics of German Unification
(Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, 1998), 58.
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17
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2.2 Increasing Demand for Transfer Payments
The West German Basic Law protected all the Länder by guaranteeing equal
living conditions throughout the country. Although the law was ratified in 1949 and
amended twenty years before reunification even seemed viable, it declared that any
Länder that acceded would also follow the Basic Law.18 Because achieving immediate
social and economic equality was impossible, politicians had to decide on which factor
they would place more emphasis. West Germans inevitably had to economically support
the unification, but contested exactly how much they would sacrifice. As previously
mentioned, the West German federal government was much more willing to financially
support their eastern neighbors, but state-level governments were more concerned with
protecting their constituents from the potential economic consequences of unification.
While German politicians worked to economically and socially unite their
countries, they also needed to create a way to finance GEMSU. Also in May 1990, West
Germany created the “German Unity Fund”, which allocated DM 115 billion to East
Germany over the first four years of reunification. The eleven West German Länder and
the federal government agreed to split the burden evenly between themselves and the
GDR to assist in financing the East German budget deficit (which was predicted to reach
DM 50 billion) and social programs such as unemployment and welfare.

19

These

politicians adopted many policies to address social problems in East Germany, but the

18

Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany (Bonn, Germany, May 23, 1949):
Article 72, http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_gg/englisch_gg.html#p0320 (accessed
October 17, 2012).
19
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German Unity Fund also acted as an effort to assuage the economic concerns of West
German citizens. The fund functioned more to control the redistribution of the heavy
financial burden between the federal government and the West German Länder than to
finance the East German states, which had not yet officially become a part of the Federal
Republic.20
In a very bold political move, reminiscent of George H.W. Bush’s “read my lips”
gaffe, Chancellor Kohl promised to avoid raising income taxes by implementing the
Unity Fund. To avoid raising western taxes, Bonn, the FRG capital, planned to take DM
20 billion from government savings and borrow the rest of its share from capital markets.
The federal states planned to borrow as well.21 Germany would soon learn that public
borrowing alone could not sustain East Germany’s financial needs. Despite efforts to
protect the West German taxpayers, politicians did not anticipate the increased East
German need for assistance and the westerners would have to feel some economic strain.
By 1992, the German Unity Fund had grown to DM 160.7 billion and the actual total of
financial transfers reached DM 770 billion by 1994.22 To put this number into
perspective, for the first six years of reunification each West German essentially paid DM
3,000 and each East German received DM 12,600 annually.23

20
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When examining the German Unity Fund and Unification Treaty, it becomes
increasingly clear that West German politicians decided when they would obey the Basic
Law and when they would circumvent it. This inconsistency occurred in the name of
equality and expediting the reunification process, but also in protecting West German
citizens from economic repercussions. Wolfgang Renzsch, a political scientist from the
Universität Magdeburg, cited the Basic Law as the reason for the abrupt reunification and
the efforts to converge both economies as quickly as possible. The Basic Law, however,
also divides sales-tax revenue between Länder on a per capita basis. This led to extensive
discourse and arguments between the West German states and the Federal government.
Renzsch explained in his 1998 journal article that should East Germany receive equal
amounts of tax revenue, the old Länder would lose and additional DM 4 to 5 billion. In
their opinions, West Germany had more sales tax receipts than the East, but would
receive the same revenue in return. The German Unity Fund had already established the
West German financial burden and the western, state-level politicians were, therefore,
unwilling to accept any further economic losses.24 For this reason, the old Länder
proposed a staggered system in which the new Länder would receive 55 percent of the
sales tax allocation in 1991, 70 percent in 1994, and then eventually the constitutionally
mandated per capita allocation. This proposal passed initially, but in 1991 the newly
confident leaders of the eastern Länder negotiated until their respective states earned
what was their proportionate share according to Basic Law. 25 This process of sales tax
allocation acts as yet another example of eastern and western politicians failing to find
policies which would benefit both East and West Germans. The solution to this
24
25
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predicament resulted in a further economic burden on the West so as to allow the East to
converge as quickly as possible.

2.3 Re-Privatizing Expropriated Property
The tumultuous history of Germany created the complex issue of contested
property ownership. Between the 1930s and 1980s, three separate initiatives confiscated
private property. The first, led by the Nazis, targeted the Jewish population’s homes,
industrial properties and land. The Soviet authorities led the second initiative,
immediately following 1945, and targeted Junkers, or members of Prussian and eastern
German nobility. The Bodenreform program seized millions of acres of agricultural land,
as well as industrial property and real estate as reparation for the damage done to the
Soviet Union during World War II. The final expropriation effort occurred after 1949 in
the recently established GDR. The state seized properties to establish large agricultural
cooperatives, private firms for nationalization, and the homes, lands, and accounts
abandoned by refugees who had fled to freedom.26 As a result, West Germany had to
decide how to distribute all of the soon-to-be-privatized property and industry. On June
15, 1990 both governments passed the “Joint Government Declaration on Open Property
Questions,” which was later incorporated into the Unification Treaty.
2.3.a Property
The governments created the Joint Declaration in hopes of developing a socially
responsible solution which could satisfy the citizens of both countries. Of the three
aforementioned expropriation efforts, attempting to return property seized by the Soviet
26

Smyser, Economy of United Germany, 161.
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Union before the establishment of the GDR was not an option. However, the government
would attempt restitution of some property seized by the Nazis, but mostly property
seized by GDR authorities. This was an enormous undertaking, as almost five million
Germans fled from East to West between 1950 and 1990 alone, leaving their properties
and assets for the government’s seizure.27 Fortunately for those victims of
“Aryanization”, GDR refugees, and their heirs, the joint governments chose a policy that
would benefit their citizens rather than expedite economic unification. The Joint
Declaration on the Settlement of Open Property Questions reflected this decision:
II. Trusteeship administration and similar measures limiting the use of real estate,
businesses, and other property must be rescinded. With this, citizens whose
property was taken into state administration as a result of flight [from the GDR]
or for other reasons will regain control of their property.28
The document continued, providing the option to accept compensation instead of the
property, compensation in cases where the property could not be returned, and protecting
renters from eviction or steep increases in rent. 29
By mid-1991, Germans filed over 1.5 million claims for restitution, subjecting
approximately one fourth of East German properties to claim. This created an overloaded
and sluggish system for two reasons. First, it was unclear how to approach cases of
ownership of buildings on land potentially owned by another claimant. Second, an
extended period of poor record keeping in the GDR presented many cases of multiple
claimants on the same property. As of 1993, the Officials at the Office for the Regulation
27
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of Property Questions forecast another ten years to close all of the files.30 The issues of
property ownership promoted the rights of displaced citizens, but essentially halted the
East German economy and stymied a smooth reunification process.

2.3.b Industry
The widespread expropriations confiscated not only homes, but also land
and businesses in an effort to create an economy planned from its production down to its
distribution. This presented the West Germans with an enormous task: privatizing an
economy in which 98 percent of the GDP was publicly produced and consisted of almost
two hundred cartels controlled by government ministries. These cartels, or Kombinate,
controlled almost all production, exports, and East German resources, creating a system
antithetical to a market economy. For this reason, West Germany had to reallocate and
restructure East German production.31 As well as addressing the issue of homes and real
estate, the Joint Government Declaration addressed the question of expropriated
businesses and firms:
VII. For businesses and shareholdings that were incorporated into national
property through confiscation of 1949 and 1972, the former owner will be given –
taking into account how valuable the business has become – the business as a
whole or shares or stocks in the company, provided that he does not wish to take
advantage of compensation.32
However, the issues mentioned above affected privatizing industry as well, creating an
inefficient and slow process. By the ratification of the Unification Treaty, disagreements

30
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within the government would alter the Joint Declaration so as to stimulate the East
German economy.
The prolonging of privatization combined with prioritizing the return of property
over compensation only contributed to the economic complications of unification.
Economists and politicians both agreed that private investment could save the East
German economy, but the problems with property ownership and consequent poor
infrastructure effectively dissuaded private investors.33 Before ratifying the Unification
Treaty, the West German Social Democratic Party (SPD) urged reconsideration of
placing property return above compensation, citing the need for legally secure
investments. This resulted in a caveat in the Unification Treaty:
…there shall be no return of property rights to real estate or buildings if the real
estate or building concerned is required for urgent investment purposes to be
specified in detail, particularly if it is to be used for the establishment of an
industrial enterprise and the implementation of this investment decision deserves
support from a general economic viewpoint, above all if it creates or safeguards
jobs.34
As with all other aspects of unification, two different questions emerged for West
German leaders: should the government place more importance on social or economic
issues? Those who agreed with the SPD were concerned that the imminent possibility of
a property returning to its former owner would deter private investors and further slow
the efforts of privatization. Other groups supported placing restitution above
compensation because of the social principles, encouraging the return of property to its
original owners. These groups stressed the importance of allowing formerly

33
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disenfranchised Germans to assist in the rebuilding of their economy. Furthermore, in
their opinion, how could a true market economy exist without placing the utmost
importance on private ownership of the means of production?35 In reality, as German
historian Gerhard A. Ritter explains, more factors than simply privatization deterred
private investors from East Germany, including the poor GDR infrastructure, the
inefficiency in most East German enterprises, and the fact that transfer payments went
more towards consumption than investment. German economists had already stressed
that a lack of private investment in the East German economy would result in a painfully
slow recovery and an exceedingly difficult rebuilding process.

2.3.c The Treuhandanstalt
The issue of privatization was a significant hurdle in the reunification of
Germany. To assist with this process, the East German government founded the
Treuhandanstalt, or Trust Agency. This institution had the purpose of protecting
centrally-owned properties from the collapsing state. However, the Treuhand Act and the
Unification Treaty morphed the agency into one which officially privatized and
reorganized the properties it originally protected. The Treuhand took charge of three
types of properties: state-owned businesses, land, and assets such as mining properties,
pharmacies, and the Ministry of State Security. The sheer number of properties was
overwhelming. By mid-1990, the Treuhand owned over eight thousand businesses and
Kombinate, over forty thousand factories, almost 37 billion square meters of farmland
and forestry, and almost two thousand other assets. At the time, approximately 46 percent
35
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of East Germans were employed by businesses and assets under control of the
Treuhand.36 Although the amount of land and other assets could not increase, the former
Communist control of businesses resulted in reorganization and consolidation of
properties. The restitution and selling efforts meant that these properties needed to be
broken up, increasing the number of enterprises for which the Treuhand was
responsible.37
Like many other aspects of the unification process, the business turnover rate
initially moved very slowly, delaying a quick economic recovery. The Treuhand
functioned in a way which favored West German buyers. The East German entrepreneurs
and businessmen only had money from the currency conversion, were therefore asset
poor and required loans. To acquire a loan, however, they needed equity capital, which
they did not have. 38 Equity capital is an investment in businesses, such as stock. Because
these businesses were owned by the state, East Germans did not have any stakes in the
enterprises, and therefore no equity capital with which to receive loans. The West
Germans however, despite having equity capital, did not have excess capital with which
to invest in the East. Although the West German economy fared the much better during
reunification than that of East Germany, between 1990 and 1992 the reunification deficit
increased by more than DM 100 billion. This increased real interest rates, turned
Germany into a capital-importing country, and did not leave excess capital for private

36

Herbert Brucker, Privatization in East Germany: A Neo-Institutional Analysis
(London: Frank Cass Publishers, 1997), 151.
37
Hans-Werner Sinn, “Privatization in East Germany,” NBER Working Papers Series,
no. 3998 (February 1992): 7, http://www.nber.org/papers/w3998.pdf (accessed September 24,
2012).
38
Sinn, “Privatization in East Germany,” 14.

20

investment in the East.39 Artificially high wages in East Germany further contributed to
the slow rate of business sales. The high wages resulted from West Germans negotiating
East German wages so as to prevent low-wage competitors. They hoped to prevent
migration to the West with enticingly high East German wages, but in reality this
increased unemployment and decreased the value the appeal, of Treuhand enterprises.40
In an effort to appease the numerous critics of rapid privatization of large
enterprises, the Treuhandanstalt created a branch in late 1991 called ManagementKommanditgesellschaft (MKG). This translates to Management-Limited Commercial
Partnership and it focused on restructuring enterprises that had future promise, but no
active buyers in the short run.41 The East German Land of Saxony also led the ATLAS
initiative which, when translated, means: Selected Treuhandanstalt Firms Registered by
the Land for Restructuring. ATLAS petitioned to the Treuhand for Land control of
restructuring rather than liquidation of “regionally significant” companies. This effort
helped save industrially important companies such as Jenoptik GmbH, an optical
equipment, precision instrument, and electronics manufacturer.42 By 1993, the
Treuhandanstalt had privatized over 80 percent of its holdings and prepared to shut its
doors. Four years after its founding, the Treuhand closed and four organizations took its
place, the most important being: Bundesanstalt für verinigungsbedingte Sonderaufgaben
(BvS), which monitored newly privatized firms’ contracts, and Beteiligungs-
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Management-Gesellschaft Berlin (BMGB), which was responsible for the management,
restructuring, and privatization of the Treuhand’s remaining eighty firms.43
Although the Treuhandanstalt itself was liquidated, the German economy had not
come close to recovery. By 1993 the entire country was solidly in recession. The
Treuhand itself had incurred approximately DM 230,000 million in debt, the German
Unity Fund, which had DM 115,000 million over five years, was not nearly enough,44
and the average net monetary wealth of an East German private household was only onethird of a western household.45 The government would have to find new taxes and
reforms to rescue the newly united economy.

2.4 Combatting Rising Unemployment
One of the benefits of Communist Germany was low unemployment and
high job security. In 1989, just before unification, the East German workforce consisted
of almost 9 million citizens – well over half of the population.46 Because of the
requirement to work and the deliberate efforts of planning committees to utilize the full
labor capacity of the workforce, East Germany was entirely unequipped to handle the
inevitable rise in unemployment.47 However, no capitalist society functions with full
employment and between the Treuhandanstalt and natural job loss due to exposure to
competition, unemployment would rise at staggering rates.
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To combat the social ramifications of a tumultuous economic transformation, East
Germany passed the Employment Promotion Law, in June 1990. The Employment
Promotion Law sought to adopt western labor market policies and attempted to offset the
stress caused by the impending increase in eastern unemployment. However, the EPL
differed from western policies in several ways. One aspect was the short-time working
benefit. Like western labor laws, the short-time benefit provided workers who cancelled
working time for social reasons almost their full wage. For example, a worker taking time
off for reasons relating to their child could receive up to 68 percent of their net wages.
The GDR version of the EPL, however, also made this benefit available to those workers
whose job was not expected to survive the unification. Workers participating in retraining
programs also qualified, and could even receive a percentage of their wage even higher
than that of short-time.48 Within the first year following the monetary union in July 1990,
between 6.8 and 8 million workers received short-time pay. This translates to between 75
and 90 percent of the East German workforce received short-time benefits, or
compensation for not working. Many West Germans, including the Federal Labor
Ministry, found the East German version of the EPL inefficient and troublesome. The
FLM fundamentally opposed minimum protection for the unemployed, fearing that it
would diminish the incentive to find new jobs, as well as present opportunities for benefit
abuse. Despite these fears, Labor Minister Blüm wrote to Dieter-Julius Cronenberg, an
FDP politician, explaining why he supported such generous policies. “The shift from a
planned economy to a Social Market economy with virtually no transition period [was] a
unique economic and socio-political event.” Blüm continued, saying it was policy48
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makers’ responsibility to, “minimize the risks wherever possible, in the interests of those
people affected in the GDR”.49 These sentences summarize the entire reunification
process. Federal-level politicians, more often than not, felt it was their duty to promote
social benefits in the East over supporting the western economy.
The extent to which unemployment would increase across the entire reunified
Germany did not become clear for several years. While the Treuhandanstalt liquidated
firms in the East, unemployment naturally increased. The opposite effect, however,
initially occurred in the West. The newly opened society caused an overwhelming
increase in demand for Western goods, causing employment in the old Länder to increase
from 28 to 28.7 million in 1991. Although the numbers show western employment as
increasing, these jobs did not exclusively go to West Germans. The data shows 700,000
new jobs, but in that time the number of West Germans registered as unemployed only
decreased by 300,000. This means that East German migrants took over half of these new
jobs. The initial boost to the West German economy, which included a growing GNP and
stable prices, however, did not last.50 As shown in the Graph of German Unemployment
(Figure 1), West German unemployment began to rise in 1992 and did not begin to
decrease until 1997 – after five years of record high unemployment rates across the entire
country. In contrast, East German unemployment increased dramatically for more than a
decade following GEMSU. Notably, between 1999 and 2003 East German
unemployment more than doubled that in the West.
After several years of steadily increasing unemployment rates, it became clear
that efforts, such as the EPL, were failing to bring unemployment down to an
49
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economically acceptable level, especially since the officially recorded statistics did not
include “hidden unemployment.” For example, Figure 1 shows average unemployment
in 1996 as approximately 12 percent. Including the 1.5 million Germans in early
retirement or short-time working would bring the unemployment number closer to 15
percent.51 Further political efforts in 1996 included the Action Program for Investment
and Jobs and Program for more Growth and Employment). The Investment and Jobs
Program sought several reforms, including deregulation of businesses, changes in
corporate taxation, and creating incentives for start-up businesses. The Growth and
Employment Program focused more on cutting labor costs and public spending. The
program reduced benefits such as sick-pay and paid vacation, prevented any increases in
monthly child-benefit allowances, and implemented a two year pay-freeze for public
sector employees.52 These efforts to reduce the state role in the economy, to create more
competitive businesses, and to reduce unemployment reflect one of the few areas of
reunification in which policies placed more importance on economic rather than social
issues. East Germany had transformed from a Communist society with a workforce
consisting of well over half the population to an open market economy where one-inseven workers were jobless.
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With such disparity between the job levels in East and

West Germany, the Basic Law, calling for equal living conditions throughout the entire
country, could not be followed without sacrificing some social benefits, which
discouraged people in the East from seeking employment.
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3. Conclusion: Social Policies Drove Reunification
The long and messy reunification process began in 1989 when policymakers
hoped to quickly create a unified Germany. West Germany had prospered since World
War II with a stable currency, an impressive GDP, and relatively low inflation. At the
same time, East Germany had faltered. The planned economy and its massive Kombinate
resulted in little competition between businesses. It also resulted in inefficient allocation
of resources, lower rates of production, and a much weaker currency than the Deutsche
Mark. When the Wall fell, easterners rushed west to embrace capitalism and drink CocaCola. Neither country’s citizens, however, fully anticipated the consequences they would
face, nor the sacrifices they would have to make.
Policymakers in both governments faced a power struggle. The West German
Central Bank, the Federal Government, the Länder, and the East German politicians had
to come to agreements on four major issues. The decisions surrounding currency
conversion, transfer payments, privatization and unemployment would influence both the
psychology and the economy of the unified country. The dilemma faced by these
politicians was as follows: should they pursue policies that place more importance on
social or economic issues? Ultimately, social factors trumped economics.
The unique power struggle between the Bundesbank and the Federal Government
stemmed from the Central Bank’s autonomy. Founded before West German officially
became a country, the Bundesbank operated free from political authorities and pressures.
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Its main responsibility was to oversee the stability of the Deutsche Mark and control
inflation.54 In terms of reunification, the Bundesbank advocated for austere measures that
would protect the Deutsche Mark. The proposal of a 2:1 currency conversion rate would
decrease losses in the West, but would cripple East German savings and businesses. It
became clear that for the sake of a truly reunified Germany, the Bundesbank would have
to forgo its autonomy and allow the politicians to pursue socially conscientious decisions.
The Central Bank played a smaller role in the other key issues, where
disagreements were more prevalent between the different levels of politicians. In the case
of transfer payments, politicians created the German Unity Fund. This allocated DM 115
million for West Germany to assist with the inevitable increase in the East German
budget deficit. It became clear in the first year of reunification that the German Unity
Fund grossly underestimated how much money the East would need. This sparked a
negative response from the Länder politicians, who were most concerned with their
constituents’ well-being. In accordance with the German Basic Law, which declares
equal living conditions throughout Germany, the state-level politicians had to yield to the
Federal Government and the East German need for more economic support. The everincreasing amounts of transfer payments caused an economic setback in the West in the
name of equalizing living conditions in the entire country.
The social benefits in the East were most strongly supported by the privatization
efforts. Policymakers had to decide if they should return expropriated property to
disenfranchised Germans, or to encourage private investment by selling the properties to
the highest bidders. Because Nazis and Communists had confiscated the property and
54
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because the government wanted East Germans to feel involved in the reunification, the
Joint Declaration on Open Property Settlements declared that former property-owners or
their heirs could reclaim what had once been theirs. The overwhelming number of
claimants combined with the poor record keeping of the GDR made this process
excruciatingly slow. Private investors from the West had nothing in which to invest,
slowing the East German economy’s convergence, but the citizens had the hope of
reclaiming their properties.
Policymakers put social issues aside for one key element of reunification:
unemployment. They had predicted a swift and relatively easy reunification and believed
this was occurring when West German unemployment initially decreased. East German
unemployment, however, increased tremendously and that in the West soon followed.
The eastern unemployment policies provided extremely generous unemployment
benefits. Shortly before reunification, East Germany adopted the Employment Promotion
Law. The EPL fundamentally mirrored West German employment benefits, but modified
them in more generous ways. From paying workers to stay home to allowing West
German unions to wage bargain in the East, huge amounts of money were spent on an
unproductive workforce, further crippling the East German economy. Part of the problem
stemmed from unemployed workers who received substantial pay and were therefore not
incentivized to find new work. Unemployment increased at staggering rates, and
policymakers realized that they would have to make social sacrifices to save the
economy. With a more austere plan, they pursued deregulation of business, decreasing
labor costs, and giving incentives to start-ups. These policies sought a decrease in
unemployment as well as more efficient costs of production. Although the unemployed
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received fewer benefits, the government hoped to encourage new business and galvanize
the East German economy.
The West and East reunited quickly, but not without ramifications. Citizens on
either side of the Berlin Wall paid significant prices in the name of unity. The West
poured money into the East, while East Germans suffered from not only unemployment
and low productivity, but also from the inferiority complex that ran deep in the East.
West German politicians, in order to create a united Germany, did not pursue the most
economically beneficial policies for their own country. The entire country’s economy
stumbled in the 1990s but began to recover in the 2000s. The short-term pursuit of
policies that emphasized social over economic advantages did not prevent Germany from
returning to its traditional role as the economic leader of Europe by the turn of the
century. In conclusion, politicians fought and disagreed on which policies were most
important to adopt, but in obeying the German Basic Law, they created a more powerful
and peaceful union.

Appendix
Figure 1: Graph of German Unemployment 1990-200355
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